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ANOTHER VERSION OF THE LEGAL
STATUS OF WOMEN IN WISCONSIN
By MRS.

JULIA

B. DOLAN*

The three articles dealing with the Legal Status of Women in Wisconsin, appearing in the Marquette Law Review, in February, April,
and June, 1930,1 reviewed the legal progress of women in the State
of Wisconsin. The writer of these articles compared womens' progress
with that of men. He approached from a historical viewpoint, and the
writer herein feels that that approach puts the wrong emphasis on what
has been gained for women as a class. He makes the statement that "the
legal right 6f men and women, and especially husband and wife, are so
closely interlocked that the privileges and disabilities of each must be
considered together," yet in the opinion of this writer he seems to
disregard this. Of course there can be differences of opinion. The question is whether the differences pointed out by him are differences with
a distinction.
The writer concurs that since the admission of Wisconsin as a
state of the Union, women have made rapid strides in obtaining legal
rights; and is in accord with the statement made in the previous article
that our legal position today is far more advantageous than at that time.
But the writer also feels that the present legislation pertinent to this
subject is not abreast of the times, and that society, and present economic conditions, demand, that in justice to women and in justice to the
family, constructive efforts to modernize this legislation be made. To
quote words of Justice Winslow, '"It is not because women ask it,
nor because man's gallantry prompts it, but because justice demands
it."
Practically the identical homestead and dower rights which were
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
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and most complete summary of the laws of Wisconsin respecting the legal
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part of our law in 1849 are in existence today. Women enjoyed a
dower right in one-third of a husband's property 81 years ago, as they
do today. It is true that change has been made as to the division of
this property on her death as well as giving her the one-third outright
instead of the mere benefit of it; but the important point to women
is that 81 years ago our lawmakers saw fit to award the wife the use
of one-third of her husband's property on his death, as compensation
for her companionship, work and labor, and effort in caring for the
home and bearing and rearing their children. Yet, when women, in
1931, four score years later, contend that such apportionment is unjust
and insufficient, they are censured by some for demanding more legal
rights, and for failing to appreciate what the law has provided for
them. In the writer's opinion economic conditions in four-fifths of- a
century, have altered to such an extent that women are justified in
asking for a change and an 'increase commensurate with the times.
In the writer's opinion, the development, training, education, and the
general advancement of women, entitle them to greater consideration
as man's companion and homemaker. A wife is far more valuable to
man today than in 1849, from ever), conceivable angle. Marriage is no
longer the only career open to women. Practically every known field
in business and professions include women in its ranks. So that today,
when a woman enters marriage, we have not the same situation as Wxe
had in 1849. She is, in many cases, relinquishing a comfortable and
independent income, or a promising career, in exchange for the cares
of a home and family; and, all without compensation, under the law,
save her support, and absolute necessities. Certainly, the tremendous
change which has attended woman's position in the world, warrants
the careful consideration of our legislators.
What has just been stated is applicable to the homestead law. In
1849 women enjoyed homestead privileges. While there have been some
amendments in the law since that time, the true spirit and intent of
the law was then as it is today. So that if persons agitate for changes,
it is only because they believe to do so will elevate the position of the
modern married woman to that which they believe is commensurate
with the times. Her position today is so far removed from her status
in 1849 that it is unbelievable that objection should be raised by anyone to the modernization of laws relating to her legal status. Other
things in our world have progressed with the transition attending
the passing of the years-the scale of living, standard of education,
etc., but when an attempt is made to modernize legislation to justify
the present marriage relationship from the woman's angle there is a
hue and cry that the proponents of such changes are becoming
unreasonable.
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This paper will be limited to a discussion of the previously referred
to articles from a technical and legal standpoint. The writer contends
that throughout the articles a construction is placed on statutes and
cases cited, which gives the reader and student an incomplete viewpoint of the law. The writer has selected those points which she feels
are most outstanding in that respect, and will attempt to convey to the
reader the validity of her contention.
Among the significant privileges enjoyed by women, the author
of ,the previous articles lists and elaborates upon the wife right to
insurance. Page (121). He dwells at great length upon a definition of
Chapter 158, Laws of 1851, and the subsequent amendments, and on
the great benefits derived by the wife under it. At the outset, we may
say that altogether too much emphasis is placed on the supposed advantages women enjoy under this law, and that an examination of
the law will convince the reader that the situation is far less favorable
than it appears. In the first place, the choice of carrying insurance
rests entirely with the husband. -Whether the protection which the insurance affords is needed or not, the wife has no legal remedy to compel the husband to contract for insurance. If he does carry insurance,
the wife is entirely dependent upon her husband paying the premiums.
If he cannot, or refuses to pay the premiums, the policy lapses, and the
wife loses whatever interest she might have had as beneficiary. Insurance is not classified as a "necessity" in the law, and if the husband
chooses not to continue the policy, the wife has no legal or equitable
remedy, and tinds herself in the same position as any ordinary beneficiary of an insurance policy. The insurance is thus under the dominance of her husband, and subject to his wishes and his pleasure. The
privileges and advantages provided for women by Section 246.09 of
the Statutes of 1929 allowing her to insure her husband for her own
benefit, in the opinion of this writer practically inure to any beneficiary under an insurance policy, whether man or woman.
The previous articles place emphasis on Section 246.11, "which permits the married woman beneficiary with written consent of the person
who effected the insurance, to assign, encumber or otherwise dispose
of any interest she may have in such a policy." The written consent of
the husband, (if he be the insured), would be a condition precedent
to any transaction the wife might make, so that the -privilege which
the statute attempts to give her is negligible. Of course, it is still her
husband's property to all intents and purposes, and if any assignment
or encumbrance were made in this writer's opinion she is in reality
nothing more than the agent of her husband. While it is true that "it
is of the greatest benefit to the widow, on the death of her husband, to
immediately receive the value of such a policy and enjoy the proceeds
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entirely free from the claims of the husband's creditors or the control
of the executors or administrators of his estate," yet the same rights
and privileges inure to every beneficiary of an insurance policy. Regardless of the claims of his creditors, or the condition of his estate,
if a man leaves an insurance policy which designates his brother or
father or son as beneficiary, that beneficiary has the legal and equitable
right to claim the proceeds of the policy without restraint or interference by the insured's creditors, administrators or executors, except,
of course, where fraud is an element, in which case the rights of a
wife would be similarly affected subject to the provisions of section
246.09 of the statutes.
The case of National Life Insurance Company of the U. S. vs.
Brautigan, 2 confirms the writer's objection to the law. Where the right
to change the beneficiary is reserved, the insured is permitted to change
the beneficiary, even though the same be a married woman, if done in
conformity with the terms of the policy. It follows that a married
woman who is named as a beneficiary finds herself in no more favorable or superior position than any other person named as a beneficiary,
where her husband reserves the right to change the beneficiary.
The previous writer's version of the case of Christman vs. Christman,3 does not present a complete picture to the reader. To make my
point clear, I will briefly present the undisputed facts: A married
man had taken a policy on his life in favor of his wife, reserving the
right to change the beneficiary. Twelve years later the wife obtained a
divorce. The husband died testate several months afterward, bequeathing the proceeds of the insurance policy to certain relatives. He never
made application to the Insurance Company, however, for a change of
beneficiary. The court held that, inasmuch as the insured had not
strictly complied with the express terms of the policy in changing the
beneficiary, that the wife, even though divorced, was entitled to the
proceeds. The previous writer goes on to say: " * * Itis a cardinal
principle of law that the wishes of a testator shall be effected. However, the right of the woman in such a case is superior to and supersedes the expressed intent of a last will and testament of the husband."
This is an incomplete conclusion; not alone the right of the woman in
such a case, but the right of any beneficiary under an insurance policy,
whether man or woman. A beneficiary of an insurance policy cannot
be divested of his rights by will, or in any other way, unless the
change is made in strict conformity with the provision of the policy.
The provisions of the policy will govern.
2

163 Wis. 270

3 163

\Wis. 433
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Great emphasis is placed on the wife's testamentary freedom, (pages
123-124.) The previous writer makes d point of the fact that woman
enjoys full testamentary disposition over all her separate property,
whereas the husband's right to make his will is restricted by her homestead and dower rights and the widow's right of election, which he
point clear, I will briefly present the undisputed facts: A married
inquria, because of the fact that this "exclusive privilege" is an absolute necessity. Without this protective statute our homestead and dower
laws would be a nullity. A husband's will could void the law. The previous writer does not deny nor discuss the rights of the wife to such
protective legislation; nor the fact that the husband's accumulations are
in the average case*made with the aid and assistance of the wife. Much
of the differences of opinion on these questions is due to the different
case examples in the minds of different writers when treating this question. The law gives a wife the right to nothing but support during her
husband's lifetime, but decrees that as her compensation for services
and consortium during her wifehood she be awarded one-third of her
husband's property upon his death, and her homestead rights in the
home of the parties. The question of the inequality in various cases
of such an apportionment will not be treated in this article. Aside from
that, however, the reader can comprehend the indispensability of the
section on widow's election (Section 233.13), and why it is necessary
to refer to this statute not only as an "exclusive privilege," but also
as an "absolute necessity."
On page 125 the question of "Heirship Rights." is discussed. Mention is made of the fact that where a husband dies intestate leaving no
issue the widow becomes heir to all his property, thereby cutting off
all of his relatives, including the mother-in-law, in favor of the
widow's blood relatives on her subsequent decease as an intestate.
Indisputably, the same would be true if the wife died intestate, leaving
no children. The husband would become her sole heir, cutting off the
wife's surviving relatives, including the mother-in-law, in favor of his
own blood relatives in the event he subsequently died intestate. Again,
the former article puts emphasis on the fact that the husband enjoys no
right of curtesy where the wife dies intestate, leaving children by a former marriage, not mentioning the fact that, usually, where a wife has a
separate estate which has not been consumed in purchasing the necesities and luxuries of life, the husband had no part in the wife's separate earning, or her acquisition of property by a previous marriage;
whereas, on the other hand, the wife generally may be considered to
have assisted the husband in his accumulations. As a "privilege," the
previous writer points out the fact that a married woman of eighteen
years and upwards may bar her dower in real estate; that she may
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make a will; and that the law will release her on attaining the age of
eighteen years, if married, from the custody and control of her guardian. Much space could be devoted to showing that these "privileges"
can be in many cases very much of a detriment. Granting the technical
"privilege" it may be exceedingly advantageous to the husband for his
youthful wife of eighteen years to have the right to bar her dower
and to be free from control of a guardian. The youthful husband gets
greater practical protection than the adolescent wife due to the voidability of his acts, and far from being favorable, women are conscious
that these "privileges" are frequently detrimental.
The writer concludes that with the passage of Chapter 99, Laws of
1881, the wife's rights in the matter of being permitted to sue for injury to her person and character have been materially increased to
her benefit. The fact still remains true, however, that while the husband may sue for damages for loss of his wife's consortium, companionship and services, (where she has sustained personal injuries),
yet the wife has no right to a similar suit except indirectly through the
husband or his estate obtaining compensation for his loss. This manifests that the law recognizes the right of the husband to the services
of the wife, but recognizes no corresponding right to the wife to the
services of the husband.
The previous writer makes a point of the fact that the husband's
right of curtesy in his wife's separate estate has been curtailed, disregarding the fact that the husband usually had no hand in the accumulation of this estate, or that it may be an inheritance, or individual
earnings to which he contributed nothing. It is admitted that there is
an apparent inequality between the bare provisions for dower and for
curtesy but it is expected that in normal marital relations a wife with
the ability to gather or hold an estate of moment will use equal ability
in disposing of it. On page 138, he portrays the case of "a man of business ability marrying a woman with children and who had a separate
estate, supporting them for years, paying off a mortgage which would
otherwise be foreclosed, and should she die without making provision
for him in her will, her ungrateful offsprings can turn him out in his
old age in abject poverty." A very, very extreme state of facts, and
difficult of reconciliation. Be that as it may, the law provides the husband with ways and means of protecting himself in such predicament.
In the first place, we might mention that the man in such a case would
have original choice as to his actions. Further, if he invests money in
enhancing her property, he can protect himself by receiving a mortgage
on the property as security for his investment. And there are many
other methods of preservation open to the husband which are too
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145

obvious to enumerate if his actions cannot be classified as voluntary
paymenst.
4
The reader's attention is called to the case of Munger vs Perkins,
quoted on page 139. The previous writer's statement of the case makes
it appear that the wife perpetrated a fraud. To clarify this, we submit
a brief statement of the facts. It appears that the wife in this case
joined with her husband in a deed conveying certain property to their
daughter. The consideration for the deed was payment of $100, and
an agreement on the part of the daughter to support the parents during their lifetime. Later, bankruptcy proceedings were instituted
against the husband, and an action was commenced to set aside the
aforementioned deed as fraudulent and void as to the creditors of the
husband. The creditors were successful in voiding the conveyance
The wife thereupon claimed her dower rights in this property, and
the court held that she was entitled to the same, on the ground that
the conveyance to the daughter having been set aside as fraudulent as
to the husband's creditors, she would thereupon be revested with such
rights. The previous writer on page 139, makes this statement: "Even
though she (referring to the wife) had participated in a conveyance
that was held to be fraudulent, nevertheless, the court overlooked her
participation and allowed her dower rights, together with damages for
withholding it. Again the wife scored." It does not appear that the
wife in this case was a party to a fraudulent transaction. In good faith
she parted with her dower right by a conveyance to her daughter, for
a valid consideration, to-wit, the agreement by the daughter to support the parents during their lifetime. When the creditors of the husband stepped in and succeeded in having this deed declared void, as
affecting their interests, the consideration for her having parted with
her dower rights was annihilated. There being no consideration for
her participation in the conveyance, the conveyance, of necessity, fails,
and she still retains her dower rights. As to her husband's creditors,
she never.parted with her dower rights, and it would be inequitable
to divest her of them.
On Pages 141-142, the matter of the husband's liability for his
wife's necessities is discussed. The previous writer quotes from the
case of Warner vs -eiden, 5 "What in general constitutes necessities
which a husband is bound to furnish his wife?", declaring that "they
embraced the usual provisions for the maintenance of the wife's health
and comfort appropriate to her mode of life in view of their social
station and financial abilities." Certainly, the husband can find no cause
4 62 Wis. 499
5 28 Wis. 517
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for complaint, as it is not a question of what the wife wants, but
what the husband is able to provide. The wife plainly is receiving
no favoritism from the law in this respect. That previous writer mentions the fact that "where a wife institutes an action for divorce her
attorney will, where she has no funds, promptly draw an order for
the signature of the court ordering the husband to pay the reasonable
fees of her attorney and temporary alimony." Undisputably, in the
opinion of this writer the law should give her little less. The reader
should note that this is true "where the wife has no funds." As a general rule, and in the average case, all that the husband is required to
pay is $25 to his wife's attorneys, and the balance of the costs of the
divorce suit are borne by her except as is ordered by the court in the
order of the final disposition of the action. Of course it is disagreeable
for a husband to be sued for divorce and to have to pay for what may
to him seem the unreasonable attitude and handling of the case by his
wife's attorney, who is usually a man. One may sympathize, but then
there is his wife's viewpoint also. On page 144, to again quote: "* * *
In view of the modern equality statutes is significant in that in following the decisions from the earliest day, it develops that women, in
obtaining equality statutes have gained nothing in the way of pledging
their husband's credit other than they heretofore enjoyed." May we
call attention to the fact that many of those seeking equality legislation
are attempting to do away with the pledging of the husband's credit?
Th e previous writer, on Page 145, suggests the remote-it may be
hoped, case of a husband, who in a spirit of generosity, on purchasing
real estate, causes the conveyance to run to the wife. The property immediately becomes hers, and the poor husband is left in the cold. And,
that writer adds "what the wife gets she may keep." It is to the point
to reply that a man can purchase property and cause the deed to run
to his mother or brother or sister, and if that individual wishes to
shut him out in the cold he or she can do so, possibly easier than could
the wife. It is a well known principle of law that no trust can be impressed on real estate under such a state of facts. If the wife purchased real estate out of her individual estate and "in a spirit of generosity" caused the deed to run to her husband, that would make him
the sole owner of the real estate, and all that the law would give her
would be a dower right, one-third of the fee on his death-the remaining two-thirds going to his heirs, or devisees.
In reference to the assignment of the husband's earnings, and
household property exempt from execution, on Page 146, to again
quote: "The wife is given the control of the disposition of the salary
and wages of the husband to a considerable extent and, it would seem,
amply sufficient for the needs of the ordinary wife." These statutes
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were enacted chiefly and primarily for the protection of the family,
and secondarily for the protection of the wife and husband. Moreover,
the statutory allowance of $60 per month, with $10 additional for
each child, for practical purposes is negligible, and affords insignificant
protection for the family. The exemption on household furniture is
extremely meager, and is substantially what was allowed a family in
1849. The times have changed to such an extent as to render this
('protection" almost a nullity.
As to the protection of Women in Industry, many women will dis"pute whether this is protection or discrimination. The National Woman's Party contends that these "protective measures" are discriminations; that they prevent women from entering the competitive market
on an equal basis with men, and deter them from advancement in their
work and from engaging in many gainful occupations. Primarily, the
purpose and intent of the Industrial Laws, if the basis they are sustained on by the courts is taken, is for the security of future and unborn generations, rather than for the protection of women. Men, too,
get their full share of protection under our Industrial Laws. "The
supervision over industry exercised by the Industrial Commission for
the benefit of women is far reaching." Many women are inclined to
think that it is too far reaching for the best interests of women.
In discussing "Property Rights of Husband and Wife," (Page
149), the previous writer cites the case of Helander vs. Wogesen. 6 In
this case, a man by the name of Wogesen entered into a written contract with the plaintiff to sell the plaintiff his farm, which included his
homestead, and certain personal property, including certain crops, for
$11,000. The plaintiff-paid as earnest money the sum of $1400. The
defendan't wife did not join in this contract of sale. Within the time
specified by the contract, the parties met to complete the transaction.
The defendant's wife refused to join in a deed unless they were paid
more money for the property. Finally, plaintiff agreed to pay them
$700 additional, and the deal was closed. The defendant, between the
time of the signing of the contract of sale, in August, and the closing
of the deal, the following January, had taken certain crops from the
farm. After the deal was consummated, plaintiff sued defendant for
the value of these crops. The court held that the original contract of
sale between plaintiff and defendant, entered into in August, was void,
because it- had not been participated in by the wife; that the first
valid transaction between the parties was in January, when the deal
was closed, and title passed, as at that time defendant's wife joined
in the transaction. Therefore, the previous contract of sale being void,
6 179 Wis. 520
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any crops taken by the defendant from the property were his, and
plaintiff could make no claim for their value. The decision is reasonable and just, although it may have been hard, and necessary to protect the wife's interests. Otherwise, a husband could, without consulting
his wife, enter into a contract to sell the homestead of the parties, and
the wife would be obliged to convey because of such agreement. Had
the decision been different, the wife's homestead rights would have no
adequate protection.
The previous writer refers us to the case of Henon vs. Stone Co. 7,
stating with reference thereto, "Should a husband attempt alone to
deed the homestead, his deed is not validated even by the subsequent
death of the wife without children." Briefly, the facts were these:
A husband executed a mortgage on his homestead while he and his
wife were living apart, the wife not joining in the encumbrance. On
the husband's death the wife enjoyed her homestead rights, receiving
the rents thereof until her death. The question was raised as to whether
the mortgage was valid vecause of the fact that the wife was living
apart from her husband when the mortgage was executed, thereby
dispensing with the necessity of her signature to the instrument to
make it valid. The court held that, inasmuch as the marital status of
the parties continued to the husband's decease, the wife, even though
living apart from the husband, would be a necessary party to the
validity of the mortgage. The court said: "The statute declares that a
mortgage of the homestead by a married man shall not be valid without the signature of the wife to the same; and, as we have said, the
land embraced in the moragage was occupied as a homestead by the
husband when the instrument was executed, and the marital relation
existed between him and his wife. The disability of the husband was
not removed because the wife had voluntarily left the homestead and
lived apart from him. In contemplation of law, the domicile of the
husband is the domicile of the wife; his homestead is her homestead;
and its character is not changed because the wife, for a sufficient reason, or for no reason, has seen fit to leave it and live separate from
her husband."
While a wife has the right to sue for alienation of her husband's
affections, she, nevertheless, is not entitled to sue for her loss of his
services, nor has she'the right to sue for damages for loss of consortium. "* * * to the woman," the previous writer says, "the reason-

ing that a wife in the ancient right of her support is still deprived of
and not entitled to any financial interest in the services of her husband
may seem a bit far fetched." The reader will agree that such reason7 72 Wis. 553
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ing IS far fetched. The husband is permitted to sue for services of his
wife, but no such right is given the wife.
The prospective husband undeniably can find no cause for complaint because of the Eugenics Law, which applies to him but not to
his prospective bride, or claim that he is discriminated against. Considered from a practical standpoint, the husband's burden is negligible.
The Eugenics Law, unfortunately, is so poorly enforced in the state
of Wisconsin that it is virtually nullified. The prospective husband
can claim very little imposition upon himself, hardly more than the
$2.00 fee he pays his doctor for a certificate. It would be far better for
society if the Eugenics Law were properly enforced, and that the true
spirit and intent of the law were observed.
. The previous writer cites the case of Dupont vs. Jonet,9 bringing
out the facts that an elderly widower, and the father of seven adult
children, married, and caused the deed to certain of his property to
run to himself and wife jointly. Both husband and wife were at a
later time overcome with gas, the wife living a day longer than her
husband. "The wife," it is pointed out, "took the entire real estate
by reason of the joint conveyance, which carried the right of survivorship." There is not added that the law would be equally favorable to
heirs of the husband, were he the one to die last. Had the husband
lived a day longer than the wife his heirs would take the entire estate,
leaving her heirs out entirely. Citing further, "The result is that a
husband may give his entire property to his wife and the heirs cannot
complain. Again the wife of persuasive qualities over her husband
scores to the benefit of her heirs over her husband's children who may
have assisted materially in the accumulation of his estate." In the case
cited immediately above, (Dupont vs. Jonet, 165 Wisconsin 554), the
fact that the husband caused the title to his property to run to himself
and wife shows conclusively that it was his intention to give this
property to her as his survivor. Why should his heirs have any voice
in this property during his lifetime, and what right of complaint should
they be entitled to? And if there are persuasive and designing women,
it may be asked whether there are not as many persuasive and designing men. If the beguiled widower gives his all to his second wife, to
the detriment of his children, may it not be said that there are as many
gullible and inexperienced widows who are captivated by middle aged
Romeos who succeed in parting them from their money, "to the detriment of the poor widow's children who may have assisted materially
in the accumulation."

9165 Wis. 554
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Let us call the reader's attention to the case of Friedrich vs. Huth,1"
which involved these facts: A wife inherited certain real estate from
her mother. The title to this real estate was transferred by the trustee
of the estate to the wife and her husband jointly. Upon her death, the
husband succeeded to the entire title, as the surviving joint tenant. The
executor of the wife's estate brought an action in equity to recover
this property of the husband, attempting to impress the real estate with
a trust in favor of the wife's estate. The court held that the husband,
being a joint tenant in the deed, took the entire real estate as the survivor, and that no resulting trust was created in favor of the wife's
estate even thought she had paid the consideration. The court held that
the wife having had full knowledge of the form of the conveyance at
the time it was executed and having made no objection thereto, no
trust could result.
Far from being abused in the matter of divorce, in the opinion of
this writer, the husband receives very fair and equitable treatment
from our courts. The allowances and privileges given the wife are a
minimum, and in many cases the wife has difficulty in enforcing even
this minimum.
A point is made of the fact that the statutes provide that a
divorce shall in no way affect the right of the wife to the possession
and control of her separate property. While a wife may have obtained
her separate property from her husband, if in most cases her husband
is not the source of such property, this law is reasonable. Why should
a wife's separate property be affected by a divorce? The previous
a wife's separate property be affected by a divorce?
In Westerlund vs. Hamlin, 2 (cited on Page 157), the previous
writer omits to add that if the positions of husband and wife were
reversed here that the husband would have the same advantage the
wife enjoyed. A divorce decree in this case was entered to the effect
that the receiver of property held jointly by the husband and wife pay
the wife $300 per month. The husband died before the final divorce
decree was entered, leaving a will disposing of the property. Under
Section 247.37, the wife took title to the entire property by virtue of
the joint tenancy, because the statute specifically provides that a
divorce judgment is not effective for one year. The ruling of the court
that the wife take the property as survivor was made not only because
she is a wife, but because of this statute. If the husband had occupied
the position of the wife in this case, he would, under this statute, have
been accorded identical treatment.
10

155 Wis. 196

12

188 Wis. 160
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The previous writer makes a point of the fact that the case of
Ashby vs. Ashby, 13 holds that the Statute of Limitations does not
apply to judgments for alimony. He says, "Thus a husband gains no
refuge within any Statute of Limitations by his failure to make alimony payments regularly, neither does he gain by his removal to
another state, for should he fall heir to property within the state, the
lien therefor will attach to the property he may so acquire." No one
would have us believe that he would encourage a husband to circumvent payment of alimony and that he should have some sort of
"refuge" from such payment? However, alimony being an equitable
incident of divorce jurisdiction, courts consider circumstances as to
why an ex-wife allows alimony to go uncollected for long periods, and
if it is found that she spurned what is ordered or decided against
assistance from a husband due to a decision to rely on .herself the
courts will hold her estopped as to accrued alimony and give effect to
her intentions as the part alimony. There are too many men today who,
aggrieved by a court's decision, or for some other personal reason,
make every conceivable effort to avoid payment of alimony, however
just the court's order might be. To give them further leeway by holding that as a matter of law rather than equity an alimony judgment
may be outlawed by the Statute of Limitations is inviting notliing but
trouble, and would only serve to increase the problems which burden
society, of alimony and divorce, and enforcement of law and court
orders, and would only serve to increase our too numerous contempt
actions, and the unsolved problems of divorced women without means
of support for themselves and children.
The case of Davis vs Estate of Davis, 167 Wisconsin 328, cited
by the previous writer, (Page 160), gives no advantage or concession
to the wife. To make her point clear to the reader, the writer will
briefly restate the material facts: A man named Davis married one,
Naomi, who abandoned him three months later. She entered into marriage with another six years later, and had ten children. Davis died
testate forty-three years after their marriage, and Naomi, claiming to
be his wife, claimed a widow's share of the estate. The final ruling
of the court was that, inasmuch as Davis had never applied for a divorce, and had never availed himself of his"legal remedies, Naomi still
remained his wife. The previous writer after a recital of the facts,
goes on to say: "Thus * * * when a man once marries, no matter
how unfaithful his wife may afterwards become, she remains his wife
during his lifetime and unless divorced, on his death, is his widow
with the rights the law allows to such. The law treats this sort of wife
13 174 Wis. 549
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with the same consideration as the one who in all respects has fully
performed her duties. This woman, who for forty-four years had led
her own life, bore ten children by other men, and had repudiated her
marriage in every manner conceivable, yet, in the end, was the wife
of Davis." The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in this case
was not made because Naomi Davis was a woman, but because she
was married to Davis and was never divorced by him. If Davis had
deserted her, under an identical state of facts and Naomi had died
intestate, he could come in and claim his right of curtesy, because of
the fact that their marriage had never been legally dissolved. A marriage, once consummated, remains a marriage until legally dissolved,
and merely the acts of the parties, without legal dissolution, will not
amount to such a repudiation which can be recognized by the law as
terminating the marriage union.
Referring to the case of Estate of Liesenfeld vs. Liesenfeld, 14 the
same arguments may be applied.
This writer takes exception to the previous writers version of the
case of Pfingsten vs. Pfingsten,1" (Page 161), particularly to the statement that "the husband had been persuaded by his wife to deed the
homestead worth $13,000 to her," and the statement that "The lower
court, Judge Quinlan presiding, properly refused her any alimony."
The writer believes there is nothing in the case to indicate that the
husband had be persuaded to deed the homestead to the wife. So
far as appears to this writer from the records of the case the deed
was a voluntary gift by the husband to the wife. As to Judge Quinlan's
properly refusing to award the wife alimony, the fact that the
Supreme Court held Judge Quinlan's version of the statute incorrect
shows that the lower court improperly refused to award the wife
alimony. In this case, a husband was granted a divorce on the ground
of the wife's adultery. The wife had received sole title to the homestead of the parties from her husband some time previous. The lower
court restored the property in its entirety to the husband and refused
to grant the wife any alimony or division of property. The Supreme
Court, in its opinion, among other things, makes the statement that
property possessed by husband and wife is in many cases the result
of their joint efforts, so that, equitably, a part of it should go to each,
not excluding the wife, necessarily, because of her fault being adultery.
"The division may be made according to the equities of the case, as
regards the origin of the possessions, and the relations between the
parties be completely ended as in case of a separation without any
24 196 Wis. 7.
15 164 Wis. 308
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jurisdiction to award alimony." The Supreme Court, in construing the
statute, held that an equitable division and distribution of the property
of the parties might be made, even though the wife was guilty of
adultery. Had not the Supreme Court given a reasonable construction
to the Statute, it would, of necessity, have been obliged to permit the
wife to continue to own the homestead of the parties, as, under Section 2342 of the Statutes, in effect at the time of this decision, a wife
may take title to property from her husband to hold it as her sole and
separate estate; and under Section 2372 cited in said case, no judgment of divorce can effect her right to such estate, nor can the court
in such action divest her title thereto, except upon a division of property between the parties as provided in Section 2363. (Section 2364
provides that alimony cannot be allowed the wife where divorce is
granted because of her adultery, but the division and distribution of
property may be made even thought the divorce be granted for such
cause.) The Supreiie Court's decision in this writers opinion was not
based as the previous writer indicates, because "hope is held out to the
worst of criminals," or "because the court refused to permit a wife to
be turned out in the cold," but for the reason that the reasonable interpretation of the statute made its ruling imperative.
Brenger vs. Brenger, 16 cited in the previous articles (Page 162), is
most favorable to the husband. Where the joint earnings of both parties were merged, and title placed in the wife, the court ordered an
equitable division made between the parties, instead of granting merely
an allowance to the husband out of the proceeds of the property.
Briefly restating the pertinent facts of Towns vs. Towns"7 : A judgment of divorce was awarded the husband, providing that he pay the
wife as a complete and final division of the estate, the sum of $1,000,
and $1,400 in monthly payments of $50. After the term of court had
ended, the husband sought a revision of the judgment. The Supreme
Court held that a final division having been made the wife, and the
same becoming her separate property, its allowance could not be modified after the term in which it had bee awarded. This ruling was made
because of the fact that the husband sought to have the judgment revised after the term of court had ended. Once a judgment of divorce is
entered and made final and absolute it cannot be modified under such
a state of facts. The rule is undisputed that, except for the power given
the court to open a judgment within a year after thereof, for mistake
or surprise, a judgment in a divorce action, making a final division and
distribution of the property, cannot be reviewed or altered, after the
term of court in which it was rendered. This rule is repeated in Zentzis
16
17

142 Wis. 26
171 Wis. 32
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vs. Zentis,1 8 Lally vs. Lally,1" Thompson vs. Thompson, 2 and Webster
vs. Webster. 21 In commenting on the case, after a recital of the facts,
the previous writer says: "As a consequence the divorced husband was
obliged to continue making the payments on the $1400 to this woman,
regardless of her having developed into a jail inmate, a drunkard and
otherwise bad." The court's ruling was based on the law which holds
that a judgment cannot be modified after the term of court has ended,
not because the court was inclined to favor the wife. The legal question
involved was one of procedure, and did not involve the merits of the
husband's charges.
This writer differs with the previous writer as to the proper version
to be given the case of Estate of Fox. 22 After a resume of the facts,
he makes the statement that "as between the man and the woman
before the law the latter gets the break of the game." That this statement is without merit is the opinion of this writer. The jury made its
findings to the effect that the plaintiff believed she was legally married,
had acted in good faith and did not know the legal effects of a divorce
from bed and board, and on the findings of the jury the award was
based. It is an elementary principle of law that unless the findings of
the jury are contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence they
shall stand. The court's ruling was not because they wanted to "give
the woman the break of the game," but because of this rule of law.
Where the jury found these to be the facts, they remain as decisive in
the case regardless of the charges alleged by the other side; and under
these circumstances the wife should certainly be entitled to her claim
against the deceased's estate.
Another comment made by the revious writer, on page 165, is "The
presumption-one of the strongest in the law, is in favor of the
validity of the marriage. From the very circumstances, it works to the
decided advantage of the wife." This presumption is for the benefit of
the family, and not alone for the wife. It is imperative that society,
and future generations, be accorded this presumption, in order that the
existing order of things may harmoniously continue. Would one contend that this presumption be otherwise, or that there be no presumption and that it be established by evidence when the issue is raised?
At the conclusion of his second article, the previous writer extensively and elaborately lists the advantages which women in Wisconsin
enjoy, superior to the privileges accorded the members of the male
's 163 Wis. 342
19 152 Wis. 56
20 73 Wis. 84
21 64 Wis. 438
2. 178 Wis. 369
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sek. There are a few statements made therein, however which the
writer will take up in the present paper.
In the sixth point (Page 167) he lists as a superior privilege
enjoyed by the wife is the face that "a husband cannot mortgage
the exempt household goods without her (the wife's) consent, while
she -may own such property free from any such restrictions on the
part of her husband." As a primary argument, we may say that
the wife's control in this respect is limited to only the exempt household goods, which is a negligible amount. The home is the very
foundation of society. If the wife were not given this protection, how
long would the home, and society exist? How many irresponsible
fathers and husbands, wearying of family burdens and responsibilities,
would, if they could, dispose of the household effects, and disrupt the
domicile? All too many of them. Then there must be remembered that
this restraint upon the husband is a protection to him against the
urgent demands of his creditors in as much as most families have little
else than their exempt personal property and homestead. It is more a
disability working against a family's creditors than against any member of the family. Should the wife, who is confined to the home, her
earning power curtailed, receive no protection from the law? The husband has the privilege of mortgaging and encumbering his business
and assets outside of the home (real estate excepted) without the consent of the wife. Our lawmakers also recognized the imperative necessity of withholding a portion of the household effects from the exclusive direction of the husband, for the safeguarding of the family and
home, foreseeing these dire possibilities.
His tenth point, (Page 167): "A husband cannot recover title to
any property, the title to which he has permitted to go to his wife,
except, when on divorce, the court may take pity on him and give some
of it back." No element of "pity" enters into a court of equity, which
court has jurisdiction of divorce actions. It is a matter of right, and
of restoring the parties to their status quo, of doing justice. If the
husband has conveyed property to the wife for which there was no
adequate consideration, the court, on a divorce, will make equitable
and adequate distribution. If it is presented to the court that the wife
transferred property to the husband for no adequate consideration,. the
identical treatment will be accorded. It is equity and justice, not "pity"
which gives to both parties their just dues. Of course, as he says, in
cases other than divorce a husband cannot obtain the return of property he has transferred to, or taken in his wife's name.
There is listed as a special privilege, in No. 14, Page 167, the fact
that "the widow is obliged to pay an inheritance tax only on the excess
of property of the clear value of $15,000 transferred from the hus-
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band, while he is obliged to pay such tax on the excess of the value of
$2,000 transferred t,) him from her estate." There can be no dispute
thai if the matchinery of ot'r government is to operate and function
it it only by means of taxation. Would it be just to tax a widow's inheritance to the same degree as that of the widower's? This writer
believes not. The widow, on the death of the husband, loses her means
of support. She is, in the majority of cases, unable after years spent
in the home, to enter into a heavily competitive market and earn
money for sustenance. The husband, on the contrary, usually loses no
source of revenue with the death of his wife although he may be put
to additional expense to provide his family with the curtained heart
and hand of his missing helpmate. His earning capacity is not curtailed
or diminished. From an economic and practical standpoint, the burden
of taxation should be lighter for the person who will suffer the greater
loss and hardship, than on the individual whose financial status undergoes little or no change.
In point 16, (Page 168), the previous writer says: "A judgment
of divorce is not allowed to disturb the separate estate of the wife for
the benefit of the husband, whereas his property is either divided for
her benefit or her support provided for by way of alimony." While it
may be true that a judgment of divorce will generally not disturb the
separate estate of the wife for the husband's benefit, yet, it is also
true that where a wife has a separate estate, that fact, and the relevant
issues, will vitally affect the division which the court will make between
husband and wife. If the wife's income Js substantial, she will generally be awarded a smaller share of the husband's estate or a smaller
sum in alimony than under circumstances where she is possessed of no
separate estate. The court takes all these facts into consideration in
making the award. Fortunate indeed is the husband who wife has a
separate estate, for it is to his benefit and advantage, as less alimony
will be meted out to her. As to "his" property being divided for the
wife, it certainly is not equitable to refer to the property of husband
and wife as "his." In the majority of cases, property and holdings of
husband and wife are accumulated only through joint efforts and
mutual denials, and the husband alone should not be given the entire
credit for the result.Reverting to the economic situation, where a wife
is possessed of no separate estate, some provision must be made for
her by way of alimony, as well as on the death of the husband, for
there is a complete termination of association. There must be some
recognition by the law of the wife's services to the home.
In number 24, (Page 168), he says: "The mother's pension, socalled, is intended primarily to permit the mother to maintain the
family home. While aid will be given to the needy father of small
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children, he is not relieved of his duty to support them." The husband
receives the equivalent of the "mother's pension", by government aid
where it is necessary this writer beligves. Where the woman is a
widow, she is chargeable with the c '-e and support of her children.
If she fails in her duties in these respects, she is deprived of the
custody of her children. Hence, while the father is not relieved of the
duty of support to his children, neither is the mother free from such
responsibility.
In concluding Article II, the previous writer conveys a warning to
the women of Wisconsin to the effect that in their agitation to obtain
further rights they may find themselves at a disadvantage through the
backward swinging of the pendulum. Women interested in, and agitating for, a change in our present existing domestic relations laws, cannot, nor should not be deterred, because of any such fear. They .are
agitating only for what they earnestly believe is just, fair and equitable
for both men and women. It is their intention to analyze what rights
and privileges they now have under our laws, and where they reach
the conchision that they are adequately and fairly treated they concur
in upholding the existing order of things. Where they reach the conclusion that they are deserving of greater consideration and privileges,
they feel it incumbent upon them to assert themselves. Where they can
be convinced that they are permitted greater privileges than are just
and equitable, they stand willing and ready to relinquish. Also, they
realize that along with the privileges they feel they merit, are necessarily, so-called "consequences" and responsibilities. These they do not
intend to shirk or evade. But they should not terminate their efforts
to obtain what they earnestly and conscientiously believe are just and
equal rights because of the imminent or suggested possibility that legislators may penalize them.
One of the purposes of the Review is to afford its readers a medium for
discussion of timely legal questions. Occasionally differences of opinion will
arise, and it is well that both sides have opportunity to be heard whenever
possible. Such articles express the opinions of the writers, however, and not
those of the Review.-Editor.

